In Defense of the Orthodox View of Animal Welfare

Abstract The Orthodox View of Animal Welfare (OVAW) has come under scrutiny by those who suggest that the capabilities approach provides a more explanatorily adequate analysis of animal welfare. Capabilities theorists typically proceed in arguing against the OVAW by offering intuition pumps against it—cases in which an animal’s (or animals’) circumstances are described in such a way that their welfare seems different than what the OVAW would imply. This paper defends the OVAW against such criticisms. I argue that, given its simplicity relative to the capabilities approach, the OVAW faces a merely dialectical disadvantage that ought not be mistaken for a genuine theoretical disadvantage, as it is comparatively more liable to intuition pumps given its relatively greater parsimony. I also respond to these arguments directly. First, I show that the capabilities approach has implications similar to those that capabilities theorists criticize the OVAW for having. Second, I distinguish the OVAW from positions it is mistakenly taken to imply. Finally, I dispute their descriptions of the OVAW’s implications for the welfare of particular animals.