Leibniz on the Contingency of Free Action

Abstract In Leibniz’s mature philosophy, contingency was a necessary condition for freedom. Yet it remains a puzzle in what exact sense free acts are contingent for him. I argue that his faculty psychology holds the key to resolving this puzzle. On my interpretation, an act is contingent if it is metaphysically contingent given the considerations of the agent’s power (but not her will). I argue that there is a deep connection between the power/will distinction and a largely overlooked logical distinction at the core of Leibniz’s per se possibility theory. According to this theory, something is per se possible if it lacks an internal contradiction, even if its actualization is incompatible with God’s goodness. I argue that if this logical distinction and its connection with Leibniz’s faculty psychology are appreciated, Leibniz’s views on the contingency of free acts become far more plausible than their general reception in the literature suggests.