Why Comply? Explaining Sectoral Patterns in GRECO 'S Anti‐Corruption Recommendations

ABSTRACT Why do states vary in their compliance with international anti‐corruption recommendations? Research often treats the state as a unitary actor and explains variation at country‐level. This article challenges that assumption by examining variation in compliance across institutional sectors within countries. Using original data from the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the analysis shows a clear sectoral pattern. Recommendations addressed to prosecutors are implemented most frequently, followed by those targeting judges, while recommendations directed at members of parliament show the lowest levels of compliance. The article explains this variation through the political economy of target compliance. Reform outcomes depend on the interaction between the political costs imposed by reform and the degree of control that targeted actors exercise over its implementation. We find little evidence that country‐level factors shape reform outcomes, while sector‐specific incentives provide a stronger explanation for compliance patterns. By highlighting the importance of the target population, the article contributes to research on international compliance, anti‐corruption governance, and international monitoring mechanisms.