Can democracy heal epistemic injustice?

Abstract This paper responds to the rather vague recurring hope in current research on epistemic injustice, that ‘democracy’ could be a remedy for knowledge-related forms of oppression. It takes this idea as a starting point and elaborates on it from a perspective that interlinks democratic theory, institutional analysis and social epistemology, by asking: Can democracy heal epistemic injustice? What would it take and how does this translate into institutions? In the paper’s first part, Miranda Fricker’s original distinction between hermeneutical and testimonial epistemic injustice is complemented by ‘access-denying’ forms of epistemic injustice that are caused by being excluded from knowledge acquiring, production and dissemination regimes. The paper then explores the remedies that democratic principles, procedures and institutions provide for these different forms of epistemic injustice. It discusses how more inclusive norms of communication can be institutionalised, how knowledge production practices can be opened up without jeopardising knowledge quality, and how civic organisations can be supported in conveying marginalised perspectives.