The Transformation of the Court and the Sino-Japanese War

This paper examines the personnel reorganization within the Japanese imperial court that occurred amid the political upheaval of the mid-1930s—namely, the resignation of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki and the February 26 Incident. Furthermore, its impact on the decision-making structure during the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War is analyzed. Centered on Lord Keeper Yuasa Kurahei, this new court leadership that emerged after Makino’s departure exhibited a markedly diminished grip on the political situation, revealing a serious functional vacuum. This leadership adopted a passive stance during the collapse of Ugaki Kazushige’s attempt to form a cabinet. Moreover, despite the North China Separation Movement and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it failed to adequately check or restrain the unilateral assertiveness of the military, thereby exposing the limits of its capacity for political mediation. In contrast, Emperor Hirohito emerged as an active agent of counsel and decision-making, directly intervening in pressing matters of state. The Emperor personally corrected errors of political judgment made by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal so as to forestall controversy over interference in the prerogative of supreme command. He took the initiative—for instance, by directly instructing that the operational outlook of the Army and Navy General Staffs be shared with Prime Minister Konoe—in an effort to mitigate the chronic structural defect of the Meiji constitutional order: the disjunction between state administration and the supreme command. Likewise, immediately following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he sought to pursue peace negotiations because of possible Soviet military intervention. Nevertheless, he was unable to prevent the full-scale, protracted escalation of the Sino-Japanese War despite his efforts at policy coordination through the convening of the Imperial Conference in January 1938.