Husserl must wait: The primacy of phenomenological practice

In this article, I critically examine the assumption that phenomenological practices must be understood exclusively in terms of applied philosophy. There is, I argue, a benefit starting in the practice itself when exploring its character. Here, I elaborate on several practices with distinct phenomenological characteristics as a basis for discussing what it means to do phenomenology. I distinguish between philosophical phenomenology, with philosophical analysis and conceptualisation as its primary activity, and phenomenological practice, an inductive phenomenology that evolves around the things as they appear and the skills as they are practiced. In the works of Cage, Wagenschein, and Goethe, there are clear traces of a phenomenological practice, even though they do not refer to philosophical phenomenology. The phenomenological attitude is characterised by a genuine interest and a profound respect for the phenomenon as it appears, the ability to suspend judgment, and the intention of placing phenomenon exploration at the centre of the activities. Here, the practice of sense observation lies at the very core. I conclude that we will never learn the true character of “the things” which Husserl urges us to return to by merely thinking about their essences without taking their characteristics into account. Thinking and conceptualizing are certainly skills in phenomenological practice, but they are neither the only ones nor superior to sensing and abstracting from sense observations. Exploring phenomenological practices aims to improve these practices and can, in turn, contribute new insights for phenomenological philosophy.