From a peripheral tool to a core principle: bringing strategic foresight into public sector management

Purpose Strategic foresight remains marginal in public management. This article asks why, given the growth of foresight units, long-term national strategies and better analytical tools since Roberge’s (2013) diagnosis. Design/methodology/approach The paper develops a conceptual synthesis of the strategic foresight literature, illustrated with secondary evidence from recent crises and examples from OECD and non-OECD settings. It groups recurring barriers according to the institutional processes they describe and uses this synthesis to explain why foresight remains difficult to integrate into decision-making. Findings Foresight remains marginal because six recurring barriers form a self-reinforcing institutional pattern. The article identifies evidential standing as the central mechanism through which the lock-in is reproduced, since foresight is often not treated as usable policy evidence. Foresight is more likely to be treated as evidence when it is robust, fit for the policy context, inclusively produced and connected to decision processes, but these qualities usually develop only after foresight has already won a place in decision-making. This circularity explains why one-off reforms rarely last. Breaking this circularity requires both capability inside government and institutional backing for using foresight in decisions. Originality/value The paper goes beyond listing barriers to foresight integration. It shows how those barriers form a self-reinforcing lock-in that reabsorbs single-point reform, identifies evidential standing as the problem at its centre, and develops four propositions that public management scholars can test empirically.