Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis on Logistics Sprawl Intervention and Mitigation Framework for Sustainable Urban Distribution

Abstract Logistics sprawl exacerbates negative externalities arising from distribution activities and induces social welfare losses. Focusing on the phenomenon of logistics sprawl in large cities, this study constructs a three-party asymmetric evolutionary game model among distribution enterprises, the government, and the demand side. This model incorporates heterogeneous preferences for high-quality distribution services and varying willingness to pay additional premiums, and it is applied to analyze the stability of strategic evolution for each stakeholder and the entire logistics sprawl system. The study identifies that logistics sprawl is jointly influenced by two core factors: government intervention intensity and demand-side characteristics. Under different initial conditions, the system can converge to three distinct equilibrium states, which collectively reflect the interactive mechanism between policy tools, enterprise decisions, and market preferences in logistics sprawl governance. To mitigate social welfare losses, it is recommended that the government promptly establish intervention mechanisms, proactively implement intervention measures, increase penalties for distribution enterprises conducting peripheral sprawl operations and subsidies for those operating distribution centers in urban cores, and prioritize the improvement of social welfare and the maintenance of government reputation; meanwhile, it is recommended that the government effectively integrate the transformation and upgrading of logistics facilities with urban renewal initiatives to enhance the quality of distribution services. This research provides a theoretical framework for analyzing stakeholder interactions in logistics sprawl governance and offers actionable insights for policymakers to promote sustainable urban distribution systems.