Spectral Characterization of Superposition Leakage in Deterministic-LPN Authentication Protocols

Recent work showed that LPN-based authentication protocols can be vulnerable to quantum chosen-message (Q2) attacks because independently sampled Bernoulli noise becomes a global phase under a coherent superposition query. This paper studies a narrower and explicitly separated question: how does a known deterministic noise function affect the Q2 measurement distribution of an HB-style phase oracle? We prove an exact Walsh-spectral shift identity, derive the resulting single-query distribution, and formulate two information-theoretic consequences. First, for a uniformly random secret, the mutual information between the secret and the measured outcome is exactly I(X;W) = n − H(P_g), where P_g is the squared-normalized Walsh spectrum of the noise function. Second, repeated observations identify the secret only up to the translation stabilizer of P_g. Bent functions therefore give zero information in this oracle model, while affine functions reveal the secret completely in one query. We retain a finite-sample empirical-mode bound for the unique-maximum case and derive a noise-density–spectral-flatness trade-off that forces the noise density toward 1/2 as the spectrum becomes flat. We also analyze an idealized joint-input extension corresponding to the algebraic form of HB+, while explicitly avoiding a claim that this oracle is identical to the physical Q2 interface of the protocol. The paper does not claim classical hardness or quantum security for keyed deterministic-LPN families; those questions remain open. With a public noise function g, the construction studied here is classically insecure by linear algebra, and is used only as an exact setting for spectral analysis. The accompanying artifact, AegisGuard-Q v2.0, computes the spectrum, mutual information and translation stabilizer, and reproduces the numerical tables reported in the paper. It is available at https://github.com/jayant-kumar-dev/Aegisguard-Q (release v2.0, commit 44d392cf886bfc420e2cba53bf907bdd9b66ceb3). Results were verified on Linux (Python 3.12.3) and independently reproduced on Windows (Python 3.14.5).

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-08-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21934506
Primary Topic
Wireless Communication Security Techniques
Type
preprint
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preprint

Spectral Characterization of Superposition Leakage in Deterministic-LPN Authentication Protocols

Jayant Kumar
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Wireless Communication Security Techniques
preprint

Spectral Characterization of Superposition Leakage in Deterministic-LPN Authentication Protocols

Jayant Kumar
preprint en

Abstract

Recent work showed that LPN-based authentication protocols can be vulnerable to quantum chosen-message (Q2) attacks because independently sampled Bernoulli noise becomes a global phase under a coherent superposition query. This paper studies a narrower and explicitly separated question: how does a known deterministic noise function affect the Q2 measurement distribution of an HB-style phase oracle? We prove an exact Walsh-spectral shift identity, derive the resulting single-query distribution, and formulate two information-theoretic consequences. First, for a uniformly random secret, the mutual information between the secret and the measured outcome is exactly I(X;W) = n − H(P_g), where P_g is the squared-normalized Walsh spectrum of the noise function. Second, repeated observations identify the secret only up to the translation stabilizer of P_g. Bent functions therefore give zero information in this oracle model, while affine functions reveal the secret completely in one query. We retain a finite-sample empirical-mode bound for the unique-maximum case and derive a noise-density–spectral-flatness trade-off that forces the noise density toward 1/2 as the spectrum becomes flat. We also analyze an idealized joint-input extension corresponding to the algebraic form of HB+, while explicitly avoiding a claim that this oracle is identical to the physical Q2 interface of the protocol. The paper does not claim classical hardness or quantum security for keyed deterministic-LPN families; those questions remain open. With a public noise function g, the construction studied here is classically insecure by linear algebra, and is used only as an exact setting for spectral analysis. The accompanying artifact, AegisGuard-Q v2.0, computes the spectrum, mutual information and translation stabilizer, and reproduces the numerical tables reported in the paper. It is available at https://github.com/jayant-kumar-dev/Aegisguard-Q (release v2.0, commit 44d392cf886bfc420e2cba53bf907bdd9b66ceb3). Results were verified on Linux (Python 3.12.3) and independently reproduced on Windows (Python 3.14.5).

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
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Wireless Communication Security Techniques
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Spectral Characterization of Superposition Leakage in Deterministic-LPN Authentication Protocols — Jayant Kumar · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS