Strategic Introduction of the Marketplace Channel With Product Information Disclosure

ABSTRACT This article develops a supply chain model with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream e‐platform to examine their strategic interactions. Specifically, we investigate the manufacturer's decision on whether to introduce a marketplace channel alongside an existing reselling channel on the e‐platform, and the e‐platform's strategy on whether to disclose or withhold product information to reduce consumer uncertainty regarding product valuation. Our findings show that the manufacturer chooses to introduce a marketplace channel when the informativeness level before the e‐platform's disclosure is low or when both the informativeness level and channel substitutability are high. Otherwise, the manufacturer prefers not to introduce the marketplace channel. The e‐platform is incentivized to disclose information when the informativeness level is high. Additionally, a comparison with the benchmark without consumer uncertainty shows that consumer uncertainty can reduce the manufacturer's incentive to introduce the marketplace channel in part of the parameter space, whereas marketplace‐channel introduction becomes more attractive when consumers fully understand their valuations and channel substitutability is sufficiently high. The e‐platform is also more likely to disclose information if the marketplace channel is not introduced. This research offers insights into market practices and provides practical guidance on the optimal selection of distribution channel strategies for manufacturers and information disclosure strategies for e‐platforms.