Diagnostic categories in movement: the looping effect as a key to understanding the instability of the DSM

Ian Hacking has proposed a series of notions for analyzing the human sciences. In this paper, we explore his idea of the looping effect in relation to the classification of mental illnesses. While his proposal has met with objections, we believe that the notion of the looping effect retains significant value for critically analyzing the classification system of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, we understand that the dynamics of interaction involved in the looping effect, which are established between the diagnostic categories and the classified individuals, could shed light on the ongoing revision of some of the psychiatric diagnoses listed in this manual. The article begins by analyzing the notion of the looping effect in the context of classifications of mental illnesses. Next, we examine the distinction between indifferent and interactive kinds, their relationship to the looping effect, and the instability of certain psychiatric objects and categories. We then present some of the main objections raised to this Hackinian proposal, particularly those that question the general scope of the looping effect and its capacity to differentiate between human and natural kinds. Finally, we argue that, despite existing criticisms, the notion of the looping effect remains a fruitful conceptual tool for the critical analysis of the DSM, and fundamentally for explaining the recurrent revision of some of its diagnostic categories.