What is a vote of no confidence, really? A deductive approach and global perspective

This research note explores the conditions under which political procedures for removing the prime minister and cabinet (1) cease to qualify as votes of no confidence (VNCs), (2) alter the form of government and (3) undermine the democratic character of a constitution. It argues that supermajoritarian removal procedures in countries such as Bhutan, Cameroon, Madagascar, Rwanda, Togo and Zimbabwe should not be classified as VNCs and undermine parliamentary and semi-presidential government. Other restrictions on political removal procedures – such as presidential veto power in post-Soviet Eurasia, grace periods in Papua New Guinea and anti-defection provisions in Pakistan and Bangladesh – may also modify the form of government. Like supermajoritarian removal procedures, they may also render a constitution inherently autocratic if no alternative constitutional mechanism for electorally authorising the government is in place. For this reason, the constitutional forms of government in Bangladesh and Togo contain inherent democratic defects.