Traducian dualism: a comparative defence

Abstract Substance dualism claims that humans, and presumably some animals, have an immaterial mind or soul. But where does this soul come from? This paper defends the traducian answer – the unfashionable view that souls are passed on by the parents through procreation. The defence is comparative: the paper argues that traducianism’s two main alternatives – emergent and creationist dualism –endorse assumptions based on which an at least equally plausible traducian model can be constructed. Two of the three traducian models proposed turn out also to be versions of emergentism or creationism. After reconstructing traducianism based on its paradigmatic historical representatives, the paper develops the comparison first with emergentism, then with creationism. Finally, two objections to traducianism are considered. The objection from the origin of the first soul is argued to fail, but the objection from monozygotic twinning appears to hold some weight for those not already committed to life beginning at conception. Thus, traducianism’s plausibility is higher than usually thought, but it partly depends on one’s broader positions.