From disciplines to concepts: beyond (inter-)disciplinarity in legal knowledge generation

Abstract Law is both a ubiquitous social phenomenon and an academic discipline. However, unlike with knowledge generated in many other disciplines, legal knowledge has come to sit uneasily with the notions of science. The 20 th century saw increased alienation between law and science. On the one hand, doctrinal approaches separate “legal science” from other domains of knowledge but struggle to be accepted as scientific by the broader scientific community. On the other hand, calls for infusing perspectives and methods from other disciplines into law raise questions on whether anything distinct remains in such interdisciplinary legal scholarship as opposed to its merging with other academic disciplines. The genealogy of dominant ways of legal knowledge generation as the process of creating authoritative research results that sustain and enhance the legitimacy of law as a discipline demonstrates this alienation amidst growing emphasis on “interdisciplinary” scholarship, and prompts the question of how the alienation may be remedied. This article argues that interdisciplinarity is an overly limited logic and advocates an alternative logic beyond disciplines that begins with key overarching political concepts, more than with merely interdisciplinary engagement. Legal knowledge is particularly suitable to be welcoming towards such a shift due to its interest in concepts and linkages to legal practice that underscore its practical relevance. The article argues that the study of concepts allows for a less dominating—and hence more democratic—engagement beyond disciplines, because it does not require rigid disciplinary identities. Although the focus on concepts cannot altogether replace working within disciplines, the findings point to the potential of more diverse academic spaces, often found in the “Global South”, to contribute to democratizing legal knowledge generation thanks to the relatively weaker straitjacket of disciplinary separation in general and alienation between law and science in particular in these spaces.