The tragedy of assimilated defection: Asymmetric evolutionary dynamics and external hijacks in common-pool resources

The sustainable governance of Common-Pool Resources (CPR) is traditionally conceptualized through evolutionary models that assume population homogeneity. However, globalization increasingly subjects modern CPRs to “CPR Hijacks”—the aggressive influx of hyper-mobile, exogenous capital operating alongside localized communities. To address this structural reality, this study introduces a novel mathematical framework combining macroscopic mean-field equations with microscopic Agent-Based Modeling on complex networks to analyze these asymmetric evolutionary dynamics. We endogenize a resource-dependent knowledge feedback mechanism that captures a cognitive “greed-fear” dichotomy, where the local propensity to cooperate dynamically fluctuates with the absolute resource stock. Our analysis maps four global phase transitions governed by intrinsic environmental regeneration: Inevitable Ecological Collapse, Crisis-Driven Self-Preservation, Dynamic Feedback Regulation, and Abundance-Induced Defection. Paradoxically, our model demonstrates that extreme resource abundance neutralizes local crisis perception, structurally entrenching the tragedy of the commons, whereas severe ecological scarcity serves as a strong catalyst for local solidarity. Crucially, we evaluate the theoretical limits of localized ecological buffering. We show that once the proportion of external capital crosses a critical tipping point, it overwhelms the local community's adaptive capacity, precipitating a “Tragedy of Assimilated Defection” and systemic ecological collapse. These findings provide a rigorous mathematical framework illustrating that local self-organization alone may be insufficient to withstand severe exogenous economic shocks, offering a theoretical rationale for top-down spatial boundaries and exclusion zones to support long-term CPR sustainability.