Mediation in the Absence of Enforcement: Lessons From Gaza's Asymmetric War

ABSTRACT This paper examines the possibilities and limits of mediation in highly asymmetric conflicts through the case of Qatar's engagement in Gaza between 2012 and 2026. Drawing on semi‐structured interviews, policy documents and secondary literature, it analyses the factors shaping the durability of ceasefire agreements following repeated rounds of conflict. The findings show that Qatar played a central role in facilitating dialogue, supporting humanitarian access and brokering ceasefire arrangements between parties unable to engage directly. Yet, agreements repeatedly encountered difficulties during implementation despite sustained mediation efforts. The analysis demonstrates that power asymmetries, weak enforcement, commitment problems, and limited monitoring and verification mechanisms constrained the durability of negotiated outcomes. The paper argues that mediation effectiveness should be assessed by the conditions governing their implementation, distinguishing negotiation success from implementation success. It identifies a patron‐as‐enforcer paradox, in which the external actor best placed to enforce compliance is also the principal patron of the stronger party so that the enforcement deficit is structural. The findings contribute to broader debates on mediation and conflict management in asymmetric conflicts.