Do Retaliatory Tariffs Re‐Route Trade? Evidence From the 2019 U.S. Tariffs on EU Wine

ABSTRACT In 2019, as part of the Airbus dispute, the United States (U.S.) imposed an additional 25% ad valorem retaliatory tariff on still wines originating from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Using a novel monthly panel of bilateral wine trade flows at the HS‐6 level between the U.S. and 38 trading partners from January 2000 to August 2025, this study empirically assesses the trade effects of this tariff on the U.S. wine market. The reduced‐form difference‐in‐differences gravity model is applied to quantify the impact of the tariff on U.S. wine import volumes, values, and unit prices. The results show that the retaliatory tariff significantly reduced both the quantity and value of U.S. wine imports from the targeted suppliers, while simultaneously boosting imports of observationally similar products from non‐tariffed countries, consistent with trade diversion rather than pure trade contraction. By contrast, the tariff's effect on import unit values is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting substantial duty absorption and re‐routing of trade rather than full pass‐through into U.S. border prices. These findings imply that, like other food and beverages, the impacts of tariffs on domestic wines may be partially muted by trade diversion and pricing strategies, even though the ultimate burden on U.S. consumers could remain non‐trivial given the high geographic concentration of global wine production and the time required for domestic producers and non‐tariffed suppliers to adjust. The results provides policy‐relevant evidence on the incidence and effectiveness of retaliatory tariffs in the wine sector.