An experience-based interpretation of the A versus B distinction

This paper offers a way of thinking about (an ‘interpretation’ of) contemporary philosophy of time on which the distinction between dynamic (A-theoretic) and non-dynamic (B-theoretic) views cannot be understood independently of considerations relating to temporal experience. Starting with some insights contained in Simon Prosser’s work, I suggest that (a) temporal experience cannot transparently represent time as being either A- or B-theoretic, and that (b) A-theoretic terminology partly gets its meaning from ostension (‘this is what it is for time to pass’). Moreover, I suggest distinguishing between the (official) B-theory, which claims that the process thus defined does not exist, and a metaphysically much less committed ‘Meta-B stance’, which steps away from the As and Bs altogether. I then examine the dialectic in discussions surrounding the increasingly popular view that we do not have experiences as of time passing (‘deflationism’/’veridicalism’), arguing that this is best understood as making a Meta-B, rather than a B-theoretic, claim about temporal experience. The upshot is that an experience-based interpretation of the AB distinction is viable and helps one make sense of large parts of the literature on temporal experience.