Central bank activism as constitutional struggle: the ECB’s mandate

Abstract This article applies the concept of economic activism, the theme of this symposium, to explore the ECB’s role within a more interventionist European Union. “Central bank activism” brings together and structures several legal, political, and economic debates on the changing role of central banks. The article focuses on the ECB’s mandate, starting from the premise that both its primary mandate, price stability, and its secondary mandate, support for the Union’s general economic policies, are subject to constitutional contestation as to their limits.The article suggests that these contestations should be situated within two core dimensions of EU constitutional law. The first reflects the principles of democracy and institutional balance, which concern the allocation of authority between independent, non-majoritarian institutions and electorally accountable political bodies. The second is the relationship between public intervention and market mechanisms. The article argues that the Union’s monetary constitution allows a significant degree of interpretive flexibility, but that such flexibility must remain within, and be guided by, the Union’s constitutional core: democracy, institutional balance, and market functioning. This framework helps in thinking about ECB activism within the broader turn towards economic activism in the EU. The article suggests that relying on the secondary mandate, rather than expanding the primary mandate, may offer advantages within this economic, political, and constitutional turn.