Regulating (Ab)uses of Omnibus Legislation through Judicial Review – An Empirical Study

Abstract Omnibus legislation – packaging unrelated measures in one long bill, enacted in an expedited process – is becoming a common feature in many legislatures, and recently also in EU lawmaking. While favoured by some for its effectiveness, it is also a matter of intense criticism and seen by critics as anathema to good lawmaking and as antidemocratic. This led scholars in various countries to ask whether courts should intervene and regulate the use of omnibus legislation. In related debates, scholars around the world are debating whether courts should adopt procedural models of judicial review of the legislative process and debating the possible impact of judicial review on legislative behaviour. This article attempts to provide a first empirical answer to these debates, by presenting findings from an extensive, multi-method empirical study on the impact the introduction of procedural judicial regulation on omnibus legislation had on their enactment in Israel. It shows that the introduction of judicial review had manifest, albeit short-term, impact on the scope and size of omnibus laws, but a long-term effect on the quality of their legislative process. It therefore exhibits the potential of procedural judicial review for improving lawmaking.