Technocracy or not, this is the question: can party system predict the number of technocrats in governments?

In the last three decades, Europe has witnessed an increase in the number of technocrats – non-partisan, non-elected experts appointed on the basis of technical competence – in government. This paper examines whether structural characteristics of party systems predict the share of technocrats in cabinets across 30 European countries between 2000 and 2024. Building on theories of party competition, delegation, and representation, it investigates how systemic features of party democracy shape technocratic appointments. Using fractional regression models, the study tests the relationship between the share of technocrats and three key party-system variables: ideological polarization, party system fragmentation, and party institutionalization. The findings reveal that technocrats are significantly more prevalent where ideological distance between parties complicates bargaining and creates demand for neutral mediators who can bridge incompatible policy positions. Conversely, when more parties compete for portfolios, partisan actors crowd out non-partisan experts rather than delegating to them. Most importantly, in systems where parties possess stable organizations, coherent programmatic profiles, and deep societal roots, technocratic inclusion is significantly lower.