The geospatial data paradox: Gatekeepers, dual-use risk, and the governance gap in an era of upheaval

This research note examines the dual-use risks associated with geospatial data in contemporary policing, intelligence, and counterterrorism contexts. As geospatial data become more accessible, they can be repurposed by violent non-state actors for malicious use through aggregation and analysis. Existing governance approaches have led to a growing risk of exploitation in line with these changes. We introduce the concept of ‘geospatial gatekeepers’: front-line professionals across public sector institutions who make routine decisions about data release. Drawing on Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy, we argue that the primary gap is institutional rather than technological, rooted in discretionary decision-making under conditions of limited guidance, resource constraints, and weak integration with security frameworks. Using illustrative cases, we demonstrate that fragmented but accessible datasets can be combined into operationally relevant intelligence, expanding the information available to threat actors. This creates a gap between where risk is present and where security capacity exists. We conclude by identifying implications for policing and intelligence practice and outlining priorities for improving geospatial data governance.