Industrial-policy objectives in South African competition policy

South African competition policy has long pursued industrial-policy objectives alongside its core competition mandate. Public-interest considerations were embedded in merger control from 1998, and the 2018 amendments gave them equal legal status with the competition assessment. These developments preceded the current European debate on using competition policy to advance innovation and other industrial policy objectives in the EU. This paper examines how industrial-policy objectives have been pursued in South African competition policy over the past thirty years. In merger control, these are often advanced through conditions involving ESOPs, HDP ownership commitments, and supplier and enterprise-development funds, as well as through potential-competition theories of merger harm. They are also advanced by similar types of remedies following market inquiries and, increasingly, abuse and cartel investigations.

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Publication Details

Journal
ERSA Working Paper Series
Published
2026-07-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.71587/n65tj363
Primary Topic
Merger and Competition Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Industrial-policy objectives in South African competition policy

Willem Boshoff
ERSA Working Paper Series
Merger and Competition Analysis
article

Industrial-policy objectives in South African competition policy

Willem Boshoff
article en

Abstract

South African competition policy has long pursued industrial-policy objectives alongside its core competition mandate. Public-interest considerations were embedded in merger control from 1998, and the 2018 amendments gave them equal legal status with the competition assessment. These developments preceded the current European debate on using competition policy to advance innovation and other industrial policy objectives in the EU. This paper examines how industrial-policy objectives have been pursued in South African competition policy over the past thirty years. In merger control, these are often advanced through conditions involving ESOPs, HDP ownership commitments, and supplier and enterprise-development funds, as well as through potential-competition theories of merger harm. They are also advanced by similar types of remedies following market inquiries and, increasingly, abuse and cartel investigations.

ERSA Working Paper Series
Stellenbosch University (ZA)
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Merger and Competition Analysis
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