Individual differences in overconfidence: A common core and its motivational and cognitive correlates

Judgment and decision making research has typically not explicitly considered whether there are individual differences in overconfidence. When correlations among individual measures are reported, the strength of associations tends to be modest. Despite this, we show that when using the methods of individual differences research to analyze measures of overconfidence, there is substantial evidence for reliable, trait-level overconfidence-which we call 'core overconfidence'-that is stable over both short and long time periods. Moreover, three forms of overconfidence have primarily been studied: overestimation, overplacement, and overprecision. We find individual differences in each form, and that the different forms share a common core, supporting the conceptualization of overconfidence as a stable, multifaceted trait. Differences in both self-views and in reflective cognitive processes appear to contribute to this stability: A range of individual difference measures (e.g., narcissism, actively open-minded thinking) significantly correlate with core overconfidence. These relationships are generally explained distinctly by either a relationship with confidence or accuracy. In additional studies, we find that individual differences in overconfidence are robust even when minimizing the correlations in accuracy across tasks, demonstrating that they are not specific to self-views in a narrow domain. Overall, by studying the same respondents' behaviors across domains, forms of overconfidence, and time periods, we find strong evidence that overconfidence is a stable, multifaceted trait that can be explained by common motivated and cognitive processes.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Cognition
Published
2026-07-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106665
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Individual differences in overconfidence: A common core and its motivational and cognitive correlates

Jack B. Soll, M. Asher Lawson, Richard P. Larrick
Cognition
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Individual differences in overconfidence: A common core and its motivational and cognitive correlates

Jack B. Soll, M. Asher Lawson, Richard P. Larrick
article en

Abstract

Judgment and decision making research has typically not explicitly considered whether there are individual differences in overconfidence. When correlations among individual measures are reported, the strength of associations tends to be modest. Despite this, we show that when using the methods of individual differences research to analyze measures of overconfidence, there is substantial evidence for reliable, trait-level overconfidence-which we call 'core overconfidence'-that is stable over both short and long time periods. Moreover, three forms of overconfidence have primarily been studied: overestimation, overplacement, and overprecision. We find individual differences in each form, and that the different forms share a common core, supporting the conceptualization of overconfidence as a stable, multifaceted trait. Differences in both self-views and in reflective cognitive processes appear to contribute to this stability: A range of individual difference measures (e.g., narcissism, actively open-minded thinking) significantly correlate with core overconfidence. These relationships are generally explained distinctly by either a relationship with confidence or accuracy. In additional studies, we find that individual differences in overconfidence are robust even when minimizing the correlations in accuracy across tasks, demonstrating that they are not specific to self-views in a narrow domain. Overall, by studying the same respondents' behaviors across domains, forms of overconfidence, and time periods, we find strong evidence that overconfidence is a stable, multifaceted trait that can be explained by common motivated and cognitive processes.

CognitionVol. 276
INSEAD (FR), Duke University (US)
Duke University, Johns Hopkins University
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.