Russia’s failed “muscular mediation” in Nagorno-Karabakh

From 2015 to 2023, Russia engaged in coercive diplomacy seeking to avert and then truncate war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. This article explores if the recent theory of “Muscular Mediation” can explain Russia’s successes and failures. The theory specifies how a powerful mediator can end a war via mutual compromise – by first coercing one side and then the other – but also warns about conditions under which such coercion may fail or backfire. In 2020, Russia failed both to prevent the outbreak of war and to quickly coerce Armenia to accept a compromise, then did coerce both sides into a ceasefire agreement, but three years later failed to prevent Azerbaijan from violating the ceasefire and achieving military victory. The evidence confirms the theory’s main causal mechanism: Russia succeeded when it applied strong coercion against both sides but otherwise failed. The case study also yields new theoretical insights – including about the required scope of mutual compromise, the effects of mediator motivation, the inadequacy of inducement as a substitute for coercion, the ways a mediator may deter or utilize intervention by fourth parties, and the challenges of sustaining success.