The Problem of Conjunctive Propositions in Avicennian Logic

This study examines the absence of conjunctive propositions in Avicennian logic, demonstrating that this exclusion is a principled outcome of the system’s criterion of unitary judgment (ḥukm wāḥid). In Avicennian classification, genuine propositions are defined by a determinate relation (nisba) that constitutes the object of judgment. Conjunctive compounds, by contrast, combine multiple independent assertions without establishing a single judgment and therefore cannot constitute a formal propositional type. Through an analysis of categorical, connective conditional, and disjunctive conditional propositions, and a critical review of historical and contemporary interpretations, the study shows that the system is internally consistent and philosophically coherent. Conjunctive expressions in Avicennian works serve primarily as linguistic devices to clarify meaning or illustrate contradictions, not as independent propositions. The findings clarify common misunderstandings arising from applying modern propositional logic to Avicennian texts and affirm that the absence of conjunction does not compromise the comprehensiveness of the classification. Rather, it reflects a deliberate and justified philosophical principle, ensuring that propositions remain unitary and their judgments determinate.