Saving lives by killing: the premises of the argument of the meritorious bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

This article evaluates the theoretical and empirical merits of mainstream claims that U.S. nuclear targeting of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 shortened the war with Japan and reduced its fatalities. The issue matters because the logic supporting this mainstream view continues to shape contemporary peace-through-strength theories. The analysis proceeds through a theoretical examination of the argument using classical bargaining models and an empirical assessment of the premises underlying the claim that nuclear weapons ended the Second World War. The theoretical investigation identifies a core flaw in earlier assessments: they focused exclusively on the bomb’s impact on Japan and assumed that complete submission to U.S. demands was required to end the war. The dramatic increase in U.S. destructive power strengthened its bargaining leverage, and if the United States acted rationally, this encouraged the extreme conditions it imposed on Japan for ending hostilities. This dynamic could have delayed settlement, even if the bomb’s effect on Japan pushed toward surrender. The article concludes that nuclear weapons did not reduce the war’s duration or fatalities, and that strategies relying on coercive power may secure concessions but do not lessen the length or costs of war.