Is assembly-independent government good for democracy? Bhutan, Suriname and Switzerland in comparative perspective

Assembly-independent government (AIG) is a rare and understudied hybrid of parliamentarism and presidentialism. The political executive is indirectly authorised through the elected assembly, rather than through separate presidential elections, but cannot be removed from office through an ordinary majority vote of no confidence. The article defines this hybrid from the perspective of democratic theory and studies its consequences for executive dominance and legislative majority rule. It compares AIG in Bhutan, Suriname and Switzerland and argues that its causal effects depend on the party system and the details of executive design. In Switzerland, AIG is essential to a system of complex majoritarianism that deconcentrates and depersonalises executive power, avoids the creation of veto players and empowers shifting legislative coalitions around the political center in parliament. In Bhutan and Suriname, by contrast, it contributes to the concentration of power in the chief executive. It is part of simple majoritarianism in Bhutan and competitive clientelism in Suriname. The analysis has important implications for debates about constitutional reform in cases such as Togo and the United States.