Temporary Relief, Permanent Disadvantages: The Limited Progress of the MPIA

The Appellate Body (‘AB’) of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has been paralysed due to the USA’s reluctance to approve appointment of members. The USA has criticized the AB for its inefficiency, and other procedural and substantive issues. The Multi-Party Interim Arbitration (‘MPIA’) has arisen as an interim solution to the AB crisis. The MPIA is envisaged under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘DSU’), which lacks clarity, and the MPIA mandate goes beyond DSU’s language, by for example going beyond the specified disputes under Article 25. As it will be seen in this article, since MPIA is a plurilateral solution, it lacks effectiveness and leads to increased transaction costs and uncertainty. The systematic issues with the AB raised by the USA persist even with the MPIA. As a voluntary tool, it lacks legitimacy, and very few countries have joined the MPIA, despite of significant developed and advanced developing countries. Further, the MPIA process is detrimental to the interests of third world countries since it adopts ambitious deadlines, and places additional resource burdens on developing countries. The incorporation of additional organizational measures, such as adoption of word limits, disproportionately impacts developing countries. In light of this, I argue that the MPIA has failed to garner legal and political legitimacy, notably in the view of the majority of developing countries, and has been an inadequate and flawed solution to the AB crisis.