A Call Against the Revolving Door: Examining the Impact of Frequent Appointments and Dismissals in South Sudan's Public Sector.

This paper examines the pervasive pattern of rapid appointments and dismissals within South Sudan’s public sector and argues that leadership instability has become a major impediment to effective governance, institutional development, and national progress. Drawing on governance theory and comparative public administration literature, the analysis highlights how the “revolving‑door” phenomenon disrupts policy continuity, erodes institutional memory, weakens service delivery, and undermines public trust. The analysis demonstrates that frequent reshuffles, often driven by political bargaining rather than merit have far reaching consequences for economic planning, donor confidence, peacebuilding, and state legitimacy. In response, the paper proposes a comprehensive reform agenda centred on strategic and stable appointments, including transparent selection processes, performance-based evaluations, minimum tenure requirements, and strengthened civil service institutions. The findings underscore the importance of political will in promoting a culture of stability, professionalism, and accountability. Ultimately, the paper argues that predictable, merit-based appointments are essential for building resilient institutions capable of supporting South Sudan’s long‑term development and consolidating peace.