Extending Causation Beyond Manipulation: Analogical Reasoning in Two Theories of Causation

Abstract Analogical reasoning has played an important role in philosophical theory, including manipulationist approaches to causation. Manipulationism ties causal judgments to the idea that causes function as handles for manipulating effects. This emphasis gives rise to the problem of unmanipulable causes: how should causal relations be understood in cases where manipulation is not possible? This problem poses a challenge for two influential versions of manipulationism, namely agency theory and interventionist theory, both of which seek to extend causal judgments beyond manipulable cases. This paper advances three claims. First, despite their differences, both approaches extend causal claims beyond contexts of direct manipulation in a way that presupposes analogical reasoning, even in cases where this is not explicitly acknowledged. Second, neither agency theory nor interventionist theory, as it stands, satisfies a condition on analogical warrant, since they fail to supply independent support for attributing a shared mechanism across contexts. Third, the paper examines whether appeals to laws of nature could supply such warrant and argues that this strategy ultimately fails. The analysis clarifies a structural limitation of manipulationist approaches to causation and points to the need for a more explicit account of how such analogical warrant may be established.