Mineness and the Address - Position, privacy, and the communication of experience.
Descriptions of experience do not deliver the experience — and, this paper argues, the non‑deliverywas never the interesting fact. That tokens of experience cannot travel between subjects followsalready from their bare particularity: events do not recur or transfer, for anyone. What bareparticularity cannot explain is the first‑person asymmetry — why this token, now, is open to me andclosed to you at once; why experience is had rather than merely instantiated, in the ownership senseof having. The paper’s contribution is an analysis of that mineness. A token experience is anevent‑as‑read: constituted by the position through which it occurs — the concrete standing state, thepriors and formation history and accumulated weighting through which the event passes. Positionsare individuated as particulars, and the choice is made openly: a position is a subject‑stageconsidered as the condition of reading — one thing under two descriptions — so a qualitativelyperfect duplicate occupies a numerically distinct position and is thereby a second subject. Minenessis the token’s occurring‑as‑read‑through‑this‑position, a relation that holds for exactly one system;that is the asymmetry, explained. The claim is located in the contemporary taxonomy of subjectivecharacter as an account of ownership, deliberately neutral on phenomenal for‑me‑ness, and thestandard pressure case — thought insertion — is answered through the dissociation of ownershipfrom agency, a joint the account already contains. The analysis generalizes, and the generalization ispaid on the page: closure between minds is one instance of closure between positions; every subjectalso stands on the far side of their own past, and other minds are the special, synchronic case. Oncommunication, the paper defends an addressing model: descriptions carry coordinates, notpayloads, and the receiver constructs from local stock — yielding a three‑zone map of experientialcommunication, indexed to a receiver at a time. The craniopagus case is engaged with declaredneutrality between the causal‑coupling and partial‑unity readings; the clinical career of painmeasurement is read as the addressing model in practice; Scarry’s thesis is recast as production‑sidefailure; the acknowledgment complaint is absorbed as an ethics of construction‑debt. The account isconceptual analysis and says so. The existence question — why there is anyone home at all, andwhether the having is also felt — is left exactly where it stood.
Authors
- Kirill Eneev (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-2619-1199)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-07-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21511268
- Primary Topic
- Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Type
- preprint