Uneven decentralization: political competition under asymmetry

Abstract This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization shapes political competition in democracies. While decentralization has expanded considerably since World War II, the political consequences of increasing asymmetries in the distribution of authority across regions within states remain poorly understood. Drawing on survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data covering 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies between 1960 and 2018, we analyze how centralized, symmetrically decentralized, and asymmetrically decentralized territorial arrangements affect economic voting and party system nationalization. The results show that asymmetric decentralization weakens electoral accountability in national elections while strengthening it in regional elections. In addition, it contributes to greater territorial variation in patterns of partisan support, thereby reducing the nationalization of party systems. These findings highlight the distinctive political consequences of asymmetric decentralization for democratic representation and accountability.