From courts to capital: how bankruptcy judicial reform affects corporate investment efficiency
Based on data from China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022, this paper uses the establishment of Chinese bankruptcy courts (BCs) as a quasi-natural experiment and employs a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) method to test the impact of bankruptcy judicial system reform on corporate investment efficiency. We find that after the reform, corporate investment efficiency significantly improved, with non-optimal investment efficiency decreasing by 7.5%, primarily due to a 9.7% reduction in underinvestment. The underlying mechanisms are that bankruptcy judicial reform improves financing expectations, strengthens governance, and optimizes resource allocation. This effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, firms facing greater industry competition, and firms in regions with more developed financial systems.
Authors
- Yan Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4863-5274)
- Miao Miao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8292-2399)
- Xuanzi Zeng
Institutions
- Shandong University (CN)
- South China University of Technology (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
- Published
- 2026-07-24
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-08435-x
- Primary Topic
- Corporate Insolvency and Governance
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00