Subnational electoral accountability in multilevel emerging democracies. Gubernatorial voting behavior in Argentina

Economic performance is a critical consideration for voters in multilevel systems, where clarity of responsibility is blurred and both national and subnational governments possess instruments to shape economic outcomes. A voluminous literature examined this phenomenon in developed countries. But how economic perceptions at different levels affect subnational voting behavior in emerging democracies still needs to be elucidated. Using survey data for Argentina, we test a clarity of responsibility framework based on the role of parties and fiscal institutions as informational cues that help take decisions in low-information environments. The results show that voters reward presidential copartisans—and penalize non-copartisans – according to the perceived conditions of the national economy. The local economy matters less to voters. Yet retrospective gubernatorial voting is influenced by the combining effect of vertical copartisanship and fiscal arrangements. In fiscally autonomous provinces, both copartisan and opposite governors benefit from favorable national performance. In fiscally dependent provinces only copartisans are rewarded. In short, the impact of national perceptions depends on whether governors have resources to capitalize on good economic times: where they do not, their electoral fortunes hinge on vertical copartisanship, which secures access to additional federal revenues. These findings carry broader implications for democratic accountability in the developing world.