The Limits of EU Protean Power: Why New Strategies Fall Short in the South Caucasus

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) intensified its external governance strategies in the wider Black Sea region by combining traditional instruments (‘control power’) with innovative mechanisms (‘protean power’). The EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, grant candidate status to Georgia, and deepen relations with Armenia reflects a calculated geopolitical strategy. This approach aims to strengthen the European security architecture and constrain Russia’s revisionist agenda in the Eastern Partnership region. However, the growing involvement of both regional and extra-regional actors-such as Turkey, Iran, China, India, and the Gulf states-has complicated the geopolitical landscape. Moreover, the EU’s protean gestures are often undermined by internal fragmentation among Member States and a fundamental unwillingness to assume risk in turbulent regions. As a result, the EU’s traditional instruments of engagement appear increasingly inadequate in addressing the evolving dynamics of the South Caucasus. This paper assesses why these new EU strategies have struggled to deliver meaningful geopolitical outcomes in the South Caucasus-Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia-despite heightened engagement. The limited success is attributed to intense regional competition from illiberal powers and local elites’ resistance, prompting the states to adopt hedging strategies. Drawing on the contrasting experience of the EU’s more decisive support for Ukraine and Moldova, we argue that for the EU to increase its geopolitical influence, a recalibration towards stronger security commitments and targeted empowerment of proreform elites is essential.