Turbulent equilibria: the coexistence of civil and warring oligarchic modes of rule in Colombia’s Caribbean Coast

This paper explores the persistence of the Colombian Puzzle, democracy with violence, in Colombia’s Caribbean Coast by analysing the coexistence of distinct modes of oligarchic rule, drawing on Winters’ (Citation2011) theory of oligarchic modes of rule. The core argument is that this region suffers from a turbulent equilibrium produced by the interaction of civil and warring oligarchies. These two systems of domination operate autonomously but are informally connected. Civil oligarchs, exemplified by political families like the Chars, Dávilas and Gneccos, operate predominantly on the legal side of the margins of legality. They are fully disarmed and use law to protect their wealth. In contrast, warring oligarchs, such as AUC commanders Jorge 40 and Hernán Giraldo, and their successors like the Pachencas and Clan de Golfo (AGC), operate entirely on the illegal side of the margins of legality. Their material wealth is coterminous with the exercise of coercion and territorial control, regulating both the licit and illicit economies within their domains. Unlike pure drug traffickers, they function as regulators, providing contractual certainty within the illegal economy through their coercive force. Their power is profound and immediate, and it is entirely contingent on maintaining territorial control. The resulting interaction of these functionally differentiated systems emulates a ruling oligarchy, producing a relatively stable but turbulent equilibrium that assures its persistence over time.