Security spillovers as strategic arenas: a typology of state responses under institutional asymmetry

How do states respond to transboundary security spillovers under conditions of institutional asymmetry? This article develops a typological framework that treats spillovers not as neutral externalities or automatic diffusion effects, but as strategic arenas through which states negotiate risk and leverage. It distinguishes two dimensions of variation: governance mobilisation capacity, defined as the ability to assemble implementable governance chains under pressure, and strategic response orientation, defined as whether those chains are directed primarily towards stabilisation or manipulation. Their interaction yields four ideal types: escalatory manipulators, stabilising manipulators, escalatory governors and stabilising governors. The framework is conceptually general but developed empirically from migration-related spillovers, especially refugee displacement and irregular migration, while other domains are used only as limited portability extensions. The article shows how states with similar mobilisation capacities may pursue divergent strategies and how lower-capacity states may still attempt selective stabilisation.