Protecting at Home or Providing Abroad: Refugee Policy in Civil Conflicts

Abstract When civilians flee conflict, concerned donors adopt policies intended to curb both violence and large refugee flows, viewing these objectives as complementary. Can such policies reduce the flow of refugees while safeguarding civilians? Using a model of refugee flight in civil conflict, I find donors who link aid and migration policies may fail to restrain government violence, risking increases in displacement and repression. Specifically, when donors lack leverage or have inconsistent priorities, their goals are undermined by strategic government violence. Policies aimed at reducing migration, like increasing humanitarian aid or reducing access to asylum, can yield more intense fighting because they leave a larger base of support for rebels. Threats to suspend aid similarly do not deter violence when it is clear donors’ primary concern is migration. I find if donors condition assistance on reducing both migration and violence against civilians, but prioritize curbing repression, they can achieve both goals.