Promoting Sustainable Co-Production of Community Safety in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Co-production plays an important role in improving community safety worldwide. However, in China’s governance system, where governmental authority remains strong, enterprises and the public have traditionally been passive participants, creating multiple challenges for the development of co-production. To address these challenges, this study examines the behavioral patterns and strategic choices of grassroots governments, property service enterprises (PSEs), and community residents in co-producing community safety. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed as the analytical framework, and the “Property Deliberation Council” (PDC) practice in Changsha is used to calibrate the parameters and conduct simulation analysis. The study explores the interest interactions and stability mechanisms among the three actors in community safety co-production. The results show that, under the benchmark parameter settings, the system can evolve toward an ideal stable state characterized by guided cooperation from grassroots governments, active cooperation from PSEs, and active participation from community residents. Moderate government incentives can increase the participation benefits of enterprises and residents, whereas excessive incentives may increase the cost burden on governments. Information transparency and sanction intensity generate a synergistic constraint effect. Social capital can reduce cooperation costs, suppress opportunistic behavior, and promote the transition of co-production from external mobilization to endogenous stability. This study argues that community safety co-production in the Chinese context is neither simple administrative mobilization nor citizen-led co-production. Rather, it is a governance process jointly shaped by government guidance, the embedded role of PSEs, and resident participation. The findings provide theoretical explanations and policy implications for improving community safety governance platforms, strengthening information disclosure and accountability mechanisms, cultivating community social capital, and promoting sustainable community safety co-production.

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Publication Details

Journal
Sustainability
Published
2026-07-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/su18147483
Primary Topic
Crime Patterns and Interventions
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Promoting Sustainable Co-Production of Community Safety in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Chao Liu, Sheng Zhang, Linli Tao
Sustainability
Crime Patterns and Interventions
article

Promoting Sustainable Co-Production of Community Safety in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Chao Liu, Sheng Zhang, Linli Tao
article en

Abstract

Co-production plays an important role in improving community safety worldwide. However, in China’s governance system, where governmental authority remains strong, enterprises and the public have traditionally been passive participants, creating multiple challenges for the development of co-production. To address these challenges, this study examines the behavioral patterns and strategic choices of grassroots governments, property service enterprises (PSEs), and community residents in co-producing community safety. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed as the analytical framework, and the “Property Deliberation Council” (PDC) practice in Changsha is used to calibrate the parameters and conduct simulation analysis. The study explores the interest interactions and stability mechanisms among the three actors in community safety co-production. The results show that, under the benchmark parameter settings, the system can evolve toward an ideal stable state characterized by guided cooperation from grassroots governments, active cooperation from PSEs, and active participation from community residents. Moderate government incentives can increase the participation benefits of enterprises and residents, whereas excessive incentives may increase the cost burden on governments. Information transparency and sanction intensity generate a synergistic constraint effect. Social capital can reduce cooperation costs, suppress opportunistic behavior, and promote the transition of co-production from external mobilization to endogenous stability. This study argues that community safety co-production in the Chinese context is neither simple administrative mobilization nor citizen-led co-production. Rather, it is a governance process jointly shaped by government guidance, the embedded role of PSEs, and resident participation. The findings provide theoretical explanations and policy implications for improving community safety governance platforms, strengthening information disclosure and accountability mechanisms, cultivating community social capital, and promoting sustainable community safety co-production.

SustainabilityVol. 18(14)
Xiangtan University (CN)
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Crime Patterns and Interventions
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