SPORTS PREDICTION MARKET TAKEOVER: CFTC GIVING FREE REIN TO (CONFLICTED) SPORTS LEAGUES?

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association repositioned professional sports leagues as integrity partners and governance authorities in a legalized betting market where leagues held no direct financial stake in wagering outcomes. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chair Michael Selig’s confirmation that leagues may apply for Designated Contract Market (DCM) licenses, coupled with substantial deference on manipulation determinations, has the potential to end that arrangement entirely. This article argues that Chair Selig’s invitation creates a conflict of interest intrinsic to the institutional role itself that disclosure regimes, audit trails, and information barriers cannot eliminate. Drawing on Carson’s (1994) conflicts of interest theory and its extension to sport management governance (Sherry et al., 2007), the article establishes that such conflicts demand categorical avoidance rather than mitigation. The article concludes that leagues should be prohibited from holding DCM licenses for contracts on sporting events within their control and that the CFTC has authority to address the institutional design question its own amicus brief left unanswered.

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Publication Details

Journal
Gaming Law Review
Published
2026-07-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/25725300261473061
Primary Topic
Doping in Sports
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

SPORTS PREDICTION MARKET TAKEOVER: CFTC GIVING FREE REIN TO (CONFLICTED) SPORTS LEAGUES?

Dhwanil Shah
Gaming Law Review
Doping in Sports
article

SPORTS PREDICTION MARKET TAKEOVER: CFTC GIVING FREE REIN TO (CONFLICTED) SPORTS LEAGUES?

Dhwanil Shah
article en

Abstract

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association repositioned professional sports leagues as integrity partners and governance authorities in a legalized betting market where leagues held no direct financial stake in wagering outcomes. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chair Michael Selig’s confirmation that leagues may apply for Designated Contract Market (DCM) licenses, coupled with substantial deference on manipulation determinations, has the potential to end that arrangement entirely. This article argues that Chair Selig’s invitation creates a conflict of interest intrinsic to the institutional role itself that disclosure regimes, audit trails, and information barriers cannot eliminate. Drawing on Carson’s (1994) conflicts of interest theory and its extension to sport management governance (Sherry et al., 2007), the article establishes that such conflicts demand categorical avoidance rather than mitigation. The article concludes that leagues should be prohibited from holding DCM licenses for contracts on sporting events within their control and that the CFTC has authority to address the institutional design question its own amicus brief left unanswered.

Gaming Law Review
Florida State University (US)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Doping in Sports
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