Legal warfare and the tactics of asymmetric political conflict: a reading in the strategic transformations of international relations

Purpose This article examines legal warfare as a form of asymmetric political conflict and explains how legal claims, institutional arenas and legitimacy contests reshape power relations in contemporary politics. Design/methodology/approach The article adopts a descriptive-analytical design supported by structured case comparison. The selected cases are used as comparative illustrations rather than symmetric causal tests. The analysis clarifies case-selection criteria, distinguishes between state and non-state actors and operationalizes core concepts through indicators drawn from official documents, court materials, United Nations records and state positions. Findings The article finds that legal warfare operates through interpretation of legal rules, selective compliance and legitimacy politics and exploitation of institutional asymmetries. Its effects vary by actor type, institutional access and interaction between normative claims and material capabilities. Research limitations/implications The article remains theory-driven and based on analytically structured cases rather than full causal testing; however, it offers operational indicators for future comparative and mixed-method research. Practical implications The article provides policymakers and international organizations with an analytical framework for identifying legal instrumentalization and assessing institutional and reputational effects in conflicts. Originality/value The article advances a conceptual contribution by redefining legal warfare not merely as politicization of law, but as a structured political mechanism through which actors convert legality, procedure and institutional access into strategic leverage. It also links this mechanism to indicators of power reconfiguration, legitimacy contestation and strategic cost imposition across state and non-state cases.