An empirical test of the EVIL DONE framework for understanding terrorist incidents in Iran

Abstract Research Summary In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Clarke and Newman extended environmental criminology ideas with the EVIL DONE framework to better explain terrorist target selection and vulnerability. Though widely cited, the framework has limited empirical validation. This study examines its utility using a unique data set of terrorist incidents in Iran. Using data primarily from the Global Terrorism Database (1979–2020) and supplemented with cases from the Iranian Perspective and News on Terrorism (Habilian) for 2021–2025, a total of 539 incidents were coded for EVIL DONE attributes. Environment categories displayed distinct EVIL DONE profiles across settings, and higher scores were strongly associated with both the likelihood of a fatal attack and the overall number of casualties. Policy Implications The findings provide empirical support for using EVIL DONE attributes to assess terrorist risk across places and targets and highlight the framework's value for prioritizing prevention efforts. Incorporating EVIL DONE measures into geographic risk assessments may improve the allocation of counterterrorism resources and enhance proactive prevention strategies by identifying locations and targets with elevated risk of terrorist attacks. Although terrorists are systematically shaped by opportunity structures and target vulnerabilities, situational counterterrorism strategies can harden vital infrastructure, increase guardianship around crowded or fragile targets, and reduce ease of access in exposed public settings.