Does Delaware incorporation improve shareholder value? Evidence from Trump’s surprise victory
We examine whether Delaware incorporation enhances shareholder value, leveraging the historic and wholly unexpected election of Donald Trump in 2016 as a natural experiment that sharply minimizes endogeneity concerns. This unique research design allows for a cleaner identification of the causal effect of Delaware law. We find that Delaware-incorporated firms experienced significantly more positive stock market reactions to Trump’s surprise victory, providing strong support for the ‘race to the top’ hypothesis that attributes a value premium to Delaware law. This effect translates to an average gain of $6.14 million per Delaware-incorporated firm, or a total of $7.86 billion across all Delaware firms in the sample, over the three-day window around the election. The Delaware value premium is especially pronounced when managerial ownership is higher, in line with agency theory. We also investigate Trump’s 2024 re-election and again find higher returns for Delaware firms, reinforcing our conclusion.
Authors
- Hyeongsop Shim (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8722-4610)
- Pornsit Jiraporn (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5480-7158)
- Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard
- Sang Mook Lee
Institutions
- Gachon University (KR)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- Chulalongkorn University (TH)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Cogent Business & Management
- Published
- 2026-07-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2026.2698825
- Primary Topic
- Corporate Finance and Governance
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Research Council of Thailand