Unveiling the explanatory problem in nature of science research: a critical epistemological assessment

Despite decades of research into the Nature of Science (NOS), widespread learner misconceptions persist and questions about why learners hold particular misconceptions, or why some NOS aspects are consistently more difficult to understand than others remain largely unexplored. This paper identifies and analyzes this explanatory limitation from an epistemological standpoint and calls for a shift from merely describing learner misconceptions to explaining their underlying epistemological foundations. Anchored in a framework that spans ontology, scientific practice, epistemology, and science education, we propose a model that clarifies the nature of explanation in NOS studies. Applying this model through the lens of a domain-specific approach to NOS, namely the Nature of the Sciences (NOTSs) approach and drawing on empirical findings from our previous research, we demonstrate how NOTSs can account for entrenched misconceptions documented in NOS literature. We also analyze the consensus-based approach to NOS as a scientific field in its own right, critically evaluating the sources of its limited explanatory power. Finally, we assess the explanatory capacity of the Family Resemblance Approach (FRA) to NOS, considering whether it can effectively respond to the limitations identified in the consensus-based approach or whether it encounters similar challenges. Implications for science education are also discussed.