The Complexity of Dynamic Pricing in the Logistics‐Shared Electric Vehicle Market Under the Circumstances of Operator Platform Game Cooperation and Total Carbon Emission Control and Its Application

ABSTRACT Disruptions triggered by events such as COVID‐19 have revealed the scarcity of logistics resources. Logistics shared electric vehicles (LSEVs) enhance emergency flexibility, yet competition and sustainability between incumbent and entrant LSEV operators remain underexplored. This study develops supply chain models with an incumbent and an entrant LSEV operator to systematically examine how market factors affect strategic cooperation with a promotion platform, optimal rental prices, and profitability. We further employ a complex nonlinear dynamical system Markov framework to characterize how the magnitude of price adjustment influences system stability. The results show that (1) when the platform's promotion level or its efficiency coefficient is low, or when the promotion fee rate or crowding‐out coefficient is high, platform cooperation induces destructive price competition; (2) as the level of carbon emission reduction technology increases, LSEV profits exhibit an inverted‐U pattern. Under high service homogeneity and a low carbon trading price, operators without carbon emission reduction technology upgrades may engage in free‐riding; (3) increasing the failure rate of either operator's vehicle triggers a downward price spiral for both parties; (4) the combination of higher carbon‐quota levels and their trading prices alleviate the cost burden of carbon emission reduction upgrades; and (5) overly aggressive price adjustment by either party can generate chaotic price dynamics and reduce long‐run expected profits, whereas introducing a delay‐control method effectively restores system stability.