Exposure and disclosure in countering CBRN threats: implications for nonproliferation strategy

Traditional paradigms for deterring weapons of mass destruction—anchored in punishment and denial—are increasingly inadequate for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats in today's complex security and information environments. This article introduces “exposure and disclosure” as a deterrence-relevant mechanism through which the revealing of clandestine CBRN activities can impose reputational, political, and informational costs that constrain hostile actions. Through structured comparative analysis of Russian radiological coercion at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, North Korean biological opacity, and Islamic State chemical attacks, we show how transparency and exposure can systematically reduce the coercive value of CBRN capabilities. Exposure-based deterrence operates most effectively when supported by credible detection capabilities and robust international verification regimes. The article's findings address governance gaps in current nonproliferation frameworks, where adversaries exploit ambiguity to achieve strategic effects without triggering traditional deterrent responses. Policy implications prioritize near-term, alliance-based operationalization of exposure protocols and rapid intelligence disclosure, while positioning the strengthening of verification authorities (the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and transparency mechanisms under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as longer-term goals contingent on geopolitical conditions. This reframing strengthens deterrence by integrating information-domain operations with punishment and denial, providing enhanced tools for countering subthreshold CBRN threats.