The Promissory Governance of Climate Finance

Abstract Climate finance is central to the politics of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. Drawing on Beckert’s conceptualization of promissory legitimacy, I argue that the reported results of adaptation finance projects facilitate claims about the future, which consolidate the political authority of the UNFCCC. Drawing on thinking from science and technology studies and the sociology of monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL), I explore the knowledge politics of adaptation finance. Specifically, I ask how the Green Climate Fund’s (GCF) adaptation portfolio contributes to the governance of climate change. I demonstrate how the Fund’s results processes incentivize projects to be designed for approval, rather than for implementation. The GCF Secretariat gains credibility and political authority via promissory claims about its results. Theoretically, my analysis clarifies how MEL underlies powerful claims about adaptation, despite ambiguity about the impacts of projects.