When the river changes course: aid shocks, security partnerships, and regime stability

Abstract Existing research has demonstrated that regimes with access to aid and other forms of support may be better able to forestall challenges to their rule, become more institutionally entrenched, and thus survive longer. Occasionally, however, the donors that provide such assistance withdraw it suddenly. This is often to signal disapproval over some action or to coerce the recipient in some way. Surprisingly, little work has been done toward understanding the effects of these sudden shocks to foreign assistance on the political stability of the recipient country. If one of the primary mechanisms through which external sources of support affect survival is the ability to prevent challenges to the regime, it follows that sudden negative deviations in such support should have significant consequences for regime stability. Aid—especially military aid—is often highly strategic: donors reward with aid those they wish to keep in power, and withdraw it from regimes they wish to punish. Aid shocks can be either deliberate or coincidental. In either case, such shocks may have destabilizing effects, as domestic actors may interpret them as signals that a coup might be welcome. Using an original measure of aid shocks, I find support for this intuition, but only in regimes without a broader security relationship with the U.S. I argue that in these cases, the security relationship deters regime opponents from moving against the government. These findings add to our knowledge of the effects of external revenue and support in regimes, and also underscore the critical role that international signals play in regime survival.