‘A deep aversion to democracy’: the British Army and the authoritarian perspective on Northern Ireland

This article identifies an Authoritarian theory for explaining the British state's approach to Northern Ireland, which emphasises the importance of repression, rather than conciliation, in managing conflict. Authoritarians, drawing on Neorealism and Strategic Theory, assume that the state is a ‘Single Rational Actor'. Paradoxically, although Authoritarians identify as ‘Strategists' or ‘Military Historians' – with close links to the military – their ‘Single Rational Actor' approach ignores and thereby conceals, the British Army's and the Security State's powerful, conservative-authoritarian and undemocratic political influence. Authoritarians' theoretical-ideological assertions leave them unable to resolve the tension between their crude strategic rationalist assumptions and the complexity and nuance of historical evidence. Consequently, there is a contradiction between, first, the assertion of unity in political-military relations. Second, the assertion that it was the Army that saved the nation, and was ‘learning, adapting and winning' the war. And third, strong evidence of intense political-military conflict leading to a British State Crisis and Army Emergency. Authoritarian theory is unconvincing, mistaking their view that the state should act as a ‘Single Rational Actor' for the claim that the state did act as a ‘Single Rational Actor’.